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The logo for CSN (Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear) features a vertical bar on the left side, divided into a blue upper section and a green lower section. To the right of this bar, the letters 'CSN' are displayed in a large, bold, sans-serif font. The 'C' is green, and the 'S' and 'N' are blue.

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Nuclear Safety Council instruction IS-10, revision 1, of July 30th 2014, establishing criteria for the reporting of events to the Council by the nuclear power plants

Article 2.a) of law 15/1980, of April 22nd, by which the Nuclear Safety Council (hereinafter the CSN) was created, attributes to this public body powers to «draw up and approve technical Instructions, Circulars and Guidelines relating to nuclear and radioactive facilities and to activities relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection ».

Following the publication of Nuclear Safety Council Instruction IS-10, on July 25th 2006, which establishes criteria for the reporting of events to the Council by the nuclear power plants, and taking into account the experience accumulated since its publication, it has been considered necessary to draw up a revision of the aforementioned Instruction in order to facilitate and clarify the reporting of events taking place at nuclear power plants, modifying both the general conditions for reporting and the types of events to be reported.

The three main objectives pursued through the process of notification and their associated reports are as follows:

- To inform the CSN of incidents occurring at plants in the national territory.
- To allow for the rapid intervention of the CSN, if necessary.
- To facilitate the process of exchanging operating experience between plants.

By virtue of the above, and in conformity with the legal powers foreseen in article 2.a) of Law 15/1980, of April 22nd, creating the Nuclear Safety Council, following consultation with the affected sectors and issuing of the appropriate technical reports.

This Council has agreed as follows during its meeting of July 30th 2014:

One. Objective and scope of application.

The objective of this Instruction is to establish the criteria applied by the Nuclear Safety Council to require the licensees of operating nuclear power plants to report any events occurring at these facilities that might be related to nuclear safety or radiological protection.

Events relating to security are excluded from the scope of this Instruction to all effects, these being subject to their own specific standards.

Two. Definitions.

The definitions of the terms and concepts used in the present Nuclear Safety Council Instruction correspond to those contained in the following provisions:

- Nuclear Energy Act, Law 25/1964, of April 29th.
- Law 15/1980, of April 22nd, creating the Nuclear Safety Council.
- Royal Decree 1836/1999, of December 3rd, approving the Regulation on Nuclear and Radioactive Facilities.
- Royal Decree 783/2001, of July 6th, approving the Regulation on the Protection of Health against Ionising Radiations.
- Legislative Royal Decree 1/1994, of June 20th, approving the Reworded Text of the General Social Security Act.

The following definitions are also applicable in the context of the present Instruction:

Non-scheduled intervention:

These are interventions in response to actual events or the unforeseen actuation of systems as part of a preliminary test or normal plant procedure.

Safety barriers. These are:

- a) The ceramic matrix and cladding of the nuclear fuel.
- b) The reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
- c) Containment.

Valid actuation demand:

These are actuation demands that give rise to valid signals or deliberate manual actions.

A valid signal is one that is initiated in response to actual plant conditions or to parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system safety function.

Documents and records to be kept:

Documents and records relating to nuclear safety or radiological protection, generated during the site study, construction, operation and dismantling phases of a nuclear facility, that are to be kept under suitable conditions for a specified period of time.

Site:

Fenced off area of land housing an authorised facility and belonging to the licensee, the interior of which is subject to a series of controls, limits and regulations.

Safety-related structures, systems and components.

Those whose operation is credited in design basis accident analysis with a view to:

1. Taking the facility to safe shutdown conditions and keeping it in these conditions in the long term.
2. Limiting the radiological consequences of foreseen operating events and design base accidents to within the specified limits.

3. Loss:

The absence of something in its rightful place and not knowing where it might be.

Fire:

Process of violent oxidation of a combustible material with the giving off of flames, heat or gases.

Fire event:

Rapid combustion of combustible materials with an abundance of a comburent material caused by a fire or source of ignition.

Internal flooding:

Unforeseen discharge of liquid in a plant cubicle, such that any of the following criteria are met:

1. The liquid extends outside the cubicle in which it originated.
2. It reaches or is sprayed onto metallic elements or cabinets of electrical and instrumentation systems.
3. The liquid level exceeds 50% of the height of the bedplate of mechanical components.
4. The liquid level exceeds 50% of the height at which instruments are located, except those for the detection of the water level.

Release of radioactive materials or substances:

The emission of radioactive materials or substances outside the corresponding confinement limits, along channels foreseen or not foreseen for this purpose.

Non-scheduled release:

A release of radioactive materials or substances that is not scheduled or documented.

Uncontrolled release:

The release of radioactive materials or substances occurring outside the terms in which such release was contemplated and documented.

Derived concentration in air limit:

Concentration of activity in air inhaled that, were it to be taken in by the standard-man over a working year of 2,000 hours, would give rise to an incorporation equal to the annual incorporation limit. Expressed in Becquerels per cubic metre (Bq/m³).

Non-scheduled outage:

The shutdown of the plant, understood as being the disconnection of the facility from the grid, taking place within 72 hours of discovery of the cause or condition giving rise to it.

Rated thermal power:

Thermal power as defined in the Operating Technical Specifications of nuclear power plants.

Release of radioactive materials or substances:

The emission of radioactive materials or substances outside the corresponding confinement limits, via the channels contemplated in the plant procedures for this purpose.

Three. *Licensees' responsibilities.*

The licensees of nuclear power plants shall be responsible for meeting the requirements established in the present instruction, in the manner and terms set out therein.

Four. *Reporting conditions.*

The licensees of nuclear power plants must adhere to the following conditions for the reporting of events to the Nuclear Safety Council:

4.1 The events to be reported are those set out in article five of this Instruction, regardless of whether or not they have been reported previously to the Nuclear Safety Council as a result of the declaration of an emergency situation, from among those defined in the plant Site Emergency Plan (SEP). In addition to the above, all events that, in the opinion of the operator, might be safety significant shall be reported.

4.2 Events should be reported to the Nuclear Safety Council using a trustworthy method; preferably and in this order by means of electronic register, fax or register; and furthermore the plant Resident Inspector should be informed as soon as possible.

4.3 Events shall be reported even when what is to be reported has taken place during the three years prior to its discovery.

4.4 Events shall be reported to the Nuclear Safety Council, in accordance with the formats included in appendices I and II, as soon as possible and within the maximum period indicated in brackets in each case (1 hour or 24 hours), including the preliminary information available as of that time, except as established in section 4.9. In the case of events to be reported within one hour, a second notification shall in all cases be sent within 24 hours, with the information available on the event up to that time.

4.5 In the case of reportable events that, in addition, have meant a declaration of an emergency situation, it will not be necessary to issue the one-hour notification, the first report being issued 24 hours after deactivation of the SEP using the corresponding format.

4.6 In all cases, including emergency situations, and within at most 30 days, a report on the event shall be submitted to the Nuclear Safety Council, in accordance with the format included in appendix III, with the information obtained during the time elapsing since the occurrence of the event, with special emphasis on concurrent failures and corrective actions and indicating an estimated date for implementation. This report, or a revision of it, shall include the conclusions drawn from the root cause analysis (RCA) performed. If, one month after the occurrence of the event the RCA were still to be completed, the 30-day report shall include the date foreseen for its completion.

4.7 A RCA shall be performed for all reportable events, with the possible exception of those whose causes are exclusively attributable to factors beyond the control of the licensee and that have not had anomalous consequences (human errors or failures) for the operation of the nuclear power plant. The RCA shall be performed using internationally recognised methodologies and to a scope in keeping with its safety significance.

4.8 Unless otherwise indicated in article five, the time periods shall be counted as from the moment of discovery of the event to be reported; the obligation to report shall be continuous and shall persist over time even when the terms established for each type of event have not been fulfilled.

4.9 In the case of events to be reported in accordance with section 4.3, where the event to be reported has taken place more than seven days prior to its discovery and where at the moment of such discovery there is no reportable condition present, notification will not be required in the terms indicated in section 4.4, and the initial notification may be performed as established in section 4.6, unless, in the opinion of the licensee or the CSN such notification should be made earlier.

4.10 In addition to the notifications to be made in the different time periods mentioned above, any additional degradation of the level of safety of the plant or worsening of its conditions shall be reported immediately, along with the results of evaluations of such conditions, the effectiveness of the response or of the corrective actions adopted, inaccuracies or errors modifying the contents of previous reports and reporting of any plant behaviour not understood by the licensee.

As a result, the reports submitted to the Nuclear Safety Council shall be subjected to a new revision to inform of the following circumstances:

One-hour report:

Important degradations occurring during the first 24 hours of the evolution of the event and substantially altering the contents of the report submitted.

24-hour report:

Additional degradations occurring during the event and not previously reported.

Unfavourable, unforeseen or misunderstood evolution of plant conditions as a direct result of the event.

Discovery of conditions additional to those initially reported, detected during the licensee's subsequent investigation, widening the scope of the event reported.

30-day report:

Conclusions of RCA's.

Final conclusions of the process of revision, analysis and investigation opened following the issuing of a reportable event report.

Incomplete aspects or aspects not suitably covered and to be reported.

Modification or removal of corrective actions committed to in earlier reports, including a justification.

The Nuclear Safety Council may at any time reasonably require additional information on an event or the revision of the corresponding reports.

4.11 If one same event includes more than one of the types of incidents contemplated in article five, one single notification will suffice and this circumstance should be indicated in the associated reports, with all the corresponding boxes being marked. The term for reporting shall be the shortest of the terms of the applicable events.

4.12 If the licensee, as a direct result of a report submitted to the CSN, during the processes of review and analysis of the event, were to identify new circumstances that would themselves require an additional notification for the same type of event, the new information may be included in a revision of the first event reported, using the 24-hour report format. On completion of the review and analysis process, the conclusions shall be included in a final revision of the 30-day report, which shall clearly establish its condition as completed. Any findings subsequent to this revision shall be issued as a new reportable event.

4.13 Likewise, whenever the licensee, as a result of the performance of systematic review programmes previously submitted to the CSN identifies various events that might be subject to reporting, such events may be included in successive revisions of the initial event report, under the conditions included in section 4.12.

4.14 In the event of there being any discrepancy between the Nuclear Safety Council and the licensee regarding the applicability of the reporting criteria or the different types of events, the criterion of the Nuclear Safety Council shall prevail and the notification shall be carried out in accordance with the type of event determined and indicated by the said Nuclear Safety Council. The licensee may place his discrepancy on record in the report itself.

4.15 Following the issuing of the 24-hour report, the licensee may inform the Nuclear Safety Council of the withdrawal of a reportable event when, as a result of the acquisition of additional information, it is demonstrated that the circumstances for reporting did not exist. The notification for the withdrawal of a reportable event shall include an explanation of the reasons for which withdrawal is requested and shall be considered as having been accepted if the CSN has not informed to the contrary within three months of its having been received. The numbering of the reportable event withdrawn may not be reused.

Five. *Types of reportable events.*

A. Records.

A.1 Destruction, loss, mislaying or undue alteration of documents and records to be kept, unless affecting classified documents beyond the scope of the present Instruction (24 hours).

B. Health and safety at work.

B.1 Any event in which a person who is not a professionally exposed worker may, according to a preliminary estimate, have received on the site a dose due to external irradiation or internal contamination that would exceed any of the dose limits established by the Spanish legislation or regulations for members of the public (one hour as from the results of the preliminary estimate being obtained).

B.2 Any event in which a professionally exposed worker may, according to a preliminary estimate, have received a dose due to external irradiation or internal contamination that would in a single exposure exceed any of the dose limits established by the Spanish legislation or regulations, including the limits established for special groups or situations (one hour as from the results of the preliminary estimate being obtained).

B.3 Any event in which a professionally exposed worker has, as a result of accumulated exposures and according to a preliminary estimate, exceeded any of the dose limits established by the Spanish legislation or regulations (24 hours).

B.4 Any event in which a professionally exposed worker has, during his presence at the plant, exceeded the effective dose operating restriction (20 mSv in one year) in a non-scheduled manner and as a result of a single exposure or accumulated exposures (24 hours).

B.5 Any occupational accident occurring within the double perimeter fence in which a person has died or has had to be evacuated from the facility for serious or very serious causes and in order to receive medical treatment. The accident will be qualified on the basis of the occupational medical diagnosis performed on the affected individual (one hour in the event of death, 24 hours in the event of a serious accident as from the medical diagnosis being obtained).

C. Spillage and releases of radioactive materials or substances.

C.1 Any non-planned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or substances to areas off site that might potentially imply a dose to the public in excess of 1 μ Sv (one hour).

C.2 Increase in dose rate or non-planned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or substances on site and outside the radiological zone, giving rise to a level of classification higher than that prescribed for the free access area, i.e. (24 hours):

- a. Dose rates in excess of 0.5 μ Sv/h, or
- b. Presence of detachable surface contamination, or
- c. Presence of air-borne contamination.

Situations will not be reported when the moment of release has been identified and the free access zone level of classification has been recovered in less than 12 hours from the moment of release.

C.3 Increase in dose rate or non-planned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or substances inside the radiological zone (supervised and/or controlled zone) giving rise to a level of classification two levels higher than that prescribed; i.e., exceeding of the values of two rows in the following table (24 hours):

	External radiation	Surface contamination (1)	Air-borne contamination
Supervised zone	3 µSv/h	Zero (2)	Zero
Controlled zone	25 µSv/h	4 Bq/cm ²	0.1 LDCA
Limited presence	1 mSv/h	40 Bq/cm ²	1 LDCA
Regulated presence	100 mSv/h	400 Bq/cm ²	10 LDCA

(1) Data referring to detachable beta-gamma contamination averaged over 300 cm².

(2) For practical purposes, zero contamination means equal to or lower than 0.4 Bq/cm².

Situations will not be reported when the moment of release has been identified and the previous level of classification has been recovered in less than 12 hours from the moment of release.

In addition, any non-planned or uncontrolled release, or the detection of radioactive materials or substances inside the radiological zone and implying the following shall be reported:

a) an increase in dose rate of more than 50mSv/h. Situations will not be reported when the moment of release or increasing dose rate has been identified and the previous situation has been recovered in less than 12 hours from the moment of release (24h).

b) the application to the workers of previously unforeseen special protective or surveillance measures affecting a number of persons equal to or higher than 10 (24 hours).

C.4 Any release causing the dose accumulated over the last 12 months to exceed 100 µSv (24 hours).

C.5 Any off-site release that has led to any of the setpoint values of the liquid or gaseous effluent monitors, derived from the instantaneous limits included in the Operating Technical Specifications, being exceeded (one hour).

C.6 Exit from the site of radioactive materials or substances failing to comply with, or having failed to comply with, any of the radiation intensity or contamination limits established in the Spanish regulation on the transport of hazardous goods, or detection of non-declassified radioactive materials or substances exiting the plant and managed as non-radioactive, excluding materials containing natural radionuclides in their natural state (24 hours).

D. Operating Technical Specifications (OTS's).

D.1 Initiation of the shutdown sequence when required by the Operating Technical Specifications (one hour).

D.2 Any entry into an Operating Technical Specifications condition requiring initiation of the shutdown sequence, when the latter is not initiated (24 hours).

D.3. Any operation or condition not allowed by the plant Operating Technical Specifications, except when:

a. the specification is administrative in nature, or

b. the event is simply a delay in the performance of a surveillance test, the test being performed within 24 hours of discovery and demonstrating that the item of equipment was capable of carrying out its specified safety functions, or that it will be performed within 24 hours of discovery and there is reasonable guarantee of a positive result being obtained in its performance and, in addition, measures have been taken to prevent repetition of the delay, or

c. the specifications were revised prior to the event being discovered, such that the operation or condition is no longer prohibited at the moment of discovery.

D.4 Non-compliance with an Operating Technical Specification requirement or demand for surveillance; i.e., not performing such requirement in the manner or term established, unless non-compliance with the corresponding limiting condition for operation has been declared prior to expiry of the specified period (24 hours).

D.5 Exceeding the value of an Operating Technical Specification limiting condition for operation that might affect the safety barriers or the systems required to control reactivity or power distribution in the core. Events of this type expected during the performance of scheduled tests will not be reported (24 hours).

E. Operation.

E.1 Non-scheduled plant outage. In order for a plant shutdown to be considered as scheduled, the corresponding fax indicating the moment foreseen for the shutdown must be received at the CSN Emergency Response Room (SALEM) with at least 72 hours notice. This fax shall also indicate the cause or limit value of the affected parameter that would cause the shutdown if exceeded (one hour).

E.2 Automatic or manual response to an event or condition, even though included in the safety assessments, in which there might have been a significant reduction in the safety margins. Examples: unforeseen criticality, unforeseen dilution, uncontrolled depressurisation or unforeseen cooldown of the reactor coolant system (one hour).

E.3 Any event or condition affecting the plant and that implies or has implied a potential impact on safety, including the degradation of a safety barrier. Examples: dropping of a fuel assembly or active part thereof; indication of fuel rod failures exceeding the expected values or caused by unexpected factors; unacceptable defects in pressure boundary materials or welds, including the steam generator tubes; loss of containment function or integrity; off-normal reactor coolant temperature or pressure transients; generalised or abnormal corrosion in safety systems (one hour).

E.4 Fires and fire events activating the corresponding detection systems, as long as they occur in fire areas housing structures, systems or components relating to safety or necessary for safe shutdown in the event of a fire. In the event of inoperability of the detection systems, fires or fire events that would have activated such systems in the event of their being available, or that have required the activation of an extinguishing device, shall be reported (one hour).

E.5 Internal flooding in which safety-related structures, systems or components might have been affected (one hour).

E.6 Any internal phenomenon or condition threatening the safety of the plant or preventing or significantly hindering performance of the tasks required for safe operation, including the release of toxic or inflammable gases, the release of radioactive substances, fires or explosions on the site (one hour).

E.7 Any other event not contemplated in the previous points that might, in the opinion of the operator, be of importance for safety. Depending on its importance, the event shall be reported as soon as possible.

F. Safety systems.

F.1 Automatic or manual non-scheduled actuation of the reactor protection system (one hour with the reactor critical and 24 hours with the reactor sub-critical).

F.2. Any event or condition causing a demand for the manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in this criterion (24 hours), except when:

a. The demand for actuation occurs as part of a planned sequence during testing or operation of the reactor, or

b. the actuation demand is not valid and;

i. It occurs with the system correctly out of service; or

ii. It occurs after the safety function has been completed. The systems to which this criterion is applicable are as follows:

1. Containment isolation signals affecting the containment isolation valves of more than one system or several main steam isolation valves (MSIV).

2. PWR type reactor emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), including the high, medium and low pressure injection systems and the low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.

3. BWR type reactor emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), including the high and low pressure core spray systems, the high and low pressure coolant injection systems and the low pressure coolant injection function of the residual heat removal system.

4. In BWR reactors, the isolated core cooling system and the isolation condenser.

5. In PWR reactors, the auxiliary or emergency feedwater system.

6. The containment heat removal and depressurisation systems, including the containment spray systems and emergency fans cooling systems.

7. Emergency alternating current electrical systems, including the emergency diesel generators (DG's), other electrical installations used instead of the DG's and the dedicated division III DG's at BWR plants.

8. Emergency services water systems not normally in service and having as one of their functions that of the ultimate heat sink.

F.3 Safety valve, or group of safety valves, in safety-related systems, including the steam generators, that have not opened or closed within the permissible pressure range during development of the transient, thereby failing to comply with the system design basis. Systems testing is excluded (24 hours).

F.4 Absence of forced spent fuel pool cooling for a period of more than one hour, except when due to a scheduled sequence (24 hours).

F.5 Overflowing of fuel pool or reactor cavity or unforeseen drop of level to below the minimum required (one hour).

F.6 This number is left deliberately without content.

F.7 Any event or condition, including the discovery of any deficiencies in design, construction, assembly, operation, maintenance, safety assessment, analytical methods, plant personnel actions or operating procedures that might at the moment of notification reasonably have been expected to prevent compliance with the specified safety function of structures or systems necessary for the following (24 hours):

Shutting down of the reactor and keeping it in the safe shutdown condition.

Residual heat removal.

Control of radioactive material emissions.

Mitigation of the consequences of design basis accidents.

F.8 Any event in which a single cause or condition leads at least to the inoperability of one independent train or channel in multiple systems or the inoperability of two independent trains or channels in a single system designed for the following (24 hours):

Shutting down of the reactor and keeping it in the safe shutdown condition.

Residual heat removal.

Control of radioactive material emissions.

Mitigation of the consequences of design basis accidents.

F.9 Any event or condition that, as a result of a single cause, might have prevented compliance with a specified safety function for two or more trains or channels in different systems required for the following (24 hours):

Shutting down of the reactor and keeping it in the safe shutdown condition.

Residual heat removal.

Control of radioactive material emissions.

Mitigation of the consequences of design basis accidents.

Included are errors in procedures, equipment failures and the discovery of deficiencies in design, analysis, manufacturing or construction or inadequate procedures. Excluded are dependences between trains or channels that are the natural or expectable consequence of the approved design, as well as normal or expectable degradations or wear.

G. Other situations of risk.

G.1 Discovery of unanalysed conditions at the plant that might significantly degrade safety (24 hours).

G.2 Any event that might give rise to the following (one hour):

G.2.1 Significant weakening, lasting more than 6 hours, of the capacity that the licensee would have to assess the actual situation of the plant if an emergency were to occur, including loss of the following:

a. Plant monitors, alarms and indications necessary for the assessment of emergency situations, or

b. Installations foreseen for emergency response, such as for example the Technical Support Centre (TSC) or the Emergency Support Centre (ESC).

G.2.2 Significant loss of the capacity of the plant (Control Room or TSC) to communicate with the SALEM or the Operations Coordination Centre (CECOP), this being understood as loss of certain of the following resources for a period longer than six hours, or twenty-four hours in the case of scheduled unavailability reported to the CSN:

a. All redundancy of the «dedicated» data transmission system.

b. All redundancy of the «dedicated» voice communication system.

Losses of communication will not be reported when caused by operation of the SALEM.

G.3. Occurrence of an event or condition requiring the performance of safety-related activities not contemplated in the plant procedures (one hour).

H. Off-site events.

H.1 Any natural phenomenon or condition external to the plant that implies a potential impact on safety or reduces the capacity of the operating personnel to operate the plant safely (one hour). Examples:

a. Damage to dams that might threaten the integrity of the plant.

b. Wind or rainfall in excess of a value established by the licensee, which will not be lower than 90% of the value that would activate the SEP.

- c. Uncontrolled fire at a distance of less than 5 km from the plant.
- d. Release of toxic, explosive or hazardous substances at a distance of less than 5 km from the site, whose advance might affect plant operation.
- e. Unforeseen explosions close to the site (radius of 8 km around the plant).
- f. Flooding that might reach the lower level of any of the buildings on site or any of the switchyards.
- g. Earthquakes exceeding the alarm threshold value of the plant instrumentation.
- h. Crashing of a powered aircraft at a distance of less than 2 km from the site.
- i. Abnormal air traffic over the site.
- j. Strikes affecting the operating conditions or safety of the plant.

For off-site events that might imply activation of the SEP, reporting should take place as from a threshold located below the limits established in the SEP.

Six. *Exemptions.*

The licensees of nuclear power plants may request temporary, full or partial exemption from any of the requirements included in the applicable standards, within the framework of this Instruction, suitably justifying the reasons for the request and pointing out the alternative way in which the requirements will be met, in order to maintain adequate levels of quality and safety.

Seven. *Infringements and penalties.*

The present Nuclear Safety Council Instruction is binding, pursuant to the provisions of article 2.a) of Law 15/1980, of April 22nd, creating the Nuclear Safety Council, for which reason any non-compliance therewith shall be penalised as set out in chapter XIV (articles 85 to 93) of the Nuclear Energy Act, Law 25/1964, of April 29th.

Single derogatory provision.

Nuclear Safety Council Instruction IS-10, of July 25th 2006, which establishes criteria for the reporting of events to the Council by the nuclear power plants is hereby expressly made null and void, along with whatever provisions of equal or lower rank might contradict the provisions of the present Instruction.

Single transitory provision. *Reporting of events relating to security.*

Articles one and five of the Nuclear Safety Council Instruction of July 25th 2006, numbered IS-10, shall continue to be applicable in relation to reportable events A1 and C7, as regards the obligation to report events relating to security, until such time as the Nuclear Safety Council Instruction specifically regulating such events comes into force.

Single final provision.

The present Instruction shall enter into force three months after its publication in the «Official State Gazette».

Madrid, July 30th 2014, the President of the Nuclear Safety Council, Fernando Marti Scharfhausen.

APPENDIX I

NPP LOGO		REPORT ON EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE CSN IN 1 HOUR			Sheet 1 of N	
NSI No	Rev.	EVENT DATE			Time of occurrence (hh:mm)	
		DAY	MONTH	YEAR		
Plant/Group		Name of person reporting/post		Date/time of notification	Telephone	
Power prior to event (MW thermal and electric)		Power at moment of notification (MW thermal and electric)			IR informed	
					YES	NO
TYPE OF EVENT						
B1	Any event in which a person who is not a professionally exposed worker may, according to a preliminary estimate, have received on the site a dose due to external irradiation or internal contamination that would exceed any of the dose limits established by the Spanish legislation or regulations for members of the public.					
B2	Any event in which a professionally exposed worker may, according to a preliminary estimate, have received a dose due to external irradiation or internal contamination that would in a single exposure exceed any of the dose limits established by the Spanish legislation or regulations, including the limits established for special groups or situations					
B5	Any occupational accident occurring within the double perimeter fence in which a person has died.					
C1	Any non-planned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or substances to areas off site that might potentially imply a dose to the public in excess of 1 μSv.					
C5	Any off-site release that has led to any of the setpoint values of the liquid or gaseous effluent monitors, derived from the instantaneous limits included in the Operating Technical Specifications, being exceeded.					
D1	Initiation of the shutdown sequence when required by the Operating Technical Specifications.					
D3	Any operation or condition not allowed by the plant Operating Technical Specifications.					
E1	Non-scheduled plant shutdown.					
E2	Automatic or manual response of the plant to an unexpected or unforeseen event or condition, even though included in the safety assessments, in which there might have been a significant reduction in the safety margins.					
E3	Any event or condition affecting the plant and that implies or has implied a potential impact on safety, including the degradation of a safety barrier.					
E4	Fires and fire events activating the corresponding detection systems, as long as they occur in cubicles, fire areas or zones housing structures, systems or components relating to safety.					
E5	Internal flooding, as long as this occurs in areas in which safety-related structures, systems or components might have been affected.					
E6	Any internal phenomenon or condition threatening the safety of the plant or preventing or significantly hindering performance of the tasks required for safe operation.					
E7	Any other event not contemplated in the previous points that might, in the opinion of the operator, be of importance for safety.					
F1	Automatic or manual non-scheduled actuation of the reactor protection system with the reactor critical.					
F5	Overflowing of fuel pool or reactor cavity or unforeseen drop of level to below the minimum required.					
G2	Significant weakening of the capacity of the licensee to assess the actual situation of the plant or significant loss of the capacity of the plant to communicate with the SALEM or the CECOP.					
G3	Occurrence of an event or condition requiring the performance of safety-related activities not contemplated in the plant procedures.					
H1	Any natural phenomenon or condition external to the plant that implies a potential impact on safety or reduces the capacity of the operating personnel to operate the plant safely.					

NPP LOGO	REPORT ON EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE CSN IN 1 HOUR	Sheet X of N ^(*)	
EVENT DESCRIPTION			
SITUATION AT THE MOMENT OF REPORTING			
MEASURES ADOPTED AND PLANNED			
RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL THAT HAVE OCCURRED (Quantity)			
ARE RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXPECTED?		YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>

^(*) As many pages as are necessary

APPENDIX II

NPP LOGO		REPORT ON EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE CSN IN 24 HOURS					Sheet 1 of (N)	
NSINo	Rev.	Report date	Event date			Time of occurrence of event (hh:mm)		
		(dd/mm/yyyy)	(dd/mm/yyyy)					
Plant/Group		Name of person reporting/post	Date/Time of notification			Telephone		
Power prior to event (MW thermal and electric)		Power at moment of notification (MW thermal and electric)			IR informed			
					YES	NO		
TYPE OF EVENT								
A. Records		A1 <input type="checkbox"/>						
B. Occupational health and safety		B1 <input type="checkbox"/>	B2 <input type="checkbox"/>	B3 <input type="checkbox"/>	B4 <input type="checkbox"/>	B5 <input type="checkbox"/>		
C. Releases		C1 <input type="checkbox"/>	C2 <input type="checkbox"/>	C3 <input type="checkbox"/>	C4 <input type="checkbox"/>	C5 <input type="checkbox"/>	C6 <input type="checkbox"/>	
D. Operating Technical Specifications		D1 <input type="checkbox"/>	D2 <input type="checkbox"/>	D3 <input type="checkbox"/>	D4 <input type="checkbox"/>			
E. Operation		E1 <input type="checkbox"/>	E2 <input type="checkbox"/>	E3 <input type="checkbox"/>	E4 <input type="checkbox"/>	E5 <input type="checkbox"/>	E6 <input type="checkbox"/>	E7 <input type="checkbox"/>
F. Safety systems		F1 <input type="checkbox"/>	F2 <input type="checkbox"/>	F3 <input type="checkbox"/>	F4 <input type="checkbox"/>	F5 <input type="checkbox"/>	F7 <input type="checkbox"/>	F8 <input type="checkbox"/>
G. Other situations of risk		G1 <input type="checkbox"/>	G2 <input type="checkbox"/>	G3 <input type="checkbox"/>				
H. Off-site events		H1 <input type="checkbox"/>						
EVENT DESCRIPTION								
SITUATION AT THE MOMENT OF REPORTING, IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES								
MEASURES ADOPTED AND PLANNED								
RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL THAT HAVE OCCURRED (Quantity)								
ARE RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXPECTED?					YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>		

NPP LOGO	REPORT ON EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE CSN IN 24 HOURS	Sheet X of N ^(*)	
EVENT DESCRIPTION			
SITUATION AT THE MOMENT OF REPORTING, IMMEDIATE ASSESSMENT AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES			
MEASURES ADOPTED AND PLANNED			
RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL THAT HAVE OCCURRED (Quantity)			
ARE RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EXPECTED?			YES <input type="checkbox"/>
			NO <input type="checkbox"/>

(*) As many pages as are necessary

APPENDIX III

NPP LOGO		REPORT ON EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE CSN IN 30 DAYS					Sheet 1 of(N)					
NSINo	Rev.	Report date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Event date (dd/mm/yyyy)			Time of occurrence of event (hh:mm)						
PLANT / GROUP:												
TITLE:												
TYPE OF EVENT												
A. Records					A1 <input type="checkbox"/>							
B. Occupational health and safety					B1 <input type="checkbox"/>	B2 <input type="checkbox"/>	B3 <input type="checkbox"/>	B4 <input type="checkbox"/>	B5 <input type="checkbox"/>			
C. Releases					C1 <input type="checkbox"/>	C2 <input type="checkbox"/>	C3 <input type="checkbox"/>	C4 <input type="checkbox"/>	C5 <input type="checkbox"/>	C6 <input type="checkbox"/>		
D. Operating Technical Specifications					D1 <input type="checkbox"/>	D2 <input type="checkbox"/>	D3 <input type="checkbox"/>	D4 <input type="checkbox"/>	D5 <input type="checkbox"/>			
E. Operation					E1 <input type="checkbox"/>	E2 <input type="checkbox"/>	E3 <input type="checkbox"/>	E4 <input type="checkbox"/>	E5 <input type="checkbox"/>	E6 <input type="checkbox"/>	E7 <input type="checkbox"/>	
F. Safety systems					F1 <input type="checkbox"/>	F2 <input type="checkbox"/>	F3 <input type="checkbox"/>	F4 <input type="checkbox"/>	F5 <input type="checkbox"/>	F7 <input type="checkbox"/>	F8 <input type="checkbox"/>	F9 <input type="checkbox"/>
G. Other situations of risk					G1 <input type="checkbox"/>	G2 <input type="checkbox"/>	G3 <input type="checkbox"/>					
H. Off-site events					H1 <input type="checkbox"/>							
PLANT STATUS												
INITIAL					FINAL							
Initial plant power (% of thermal and electric power)					Final plant power (% of thermal and electric power)							
<input type="checkbox"/> Stable power operation <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing power <input type="checkbox"/> Decreasing power <input type="checkbox"/> Start-up (to coupling)		<input type="checkbox"/> Hot standby <input type="checkbox"/> Hot shutdown <input type="checkbox"/> Cold shutdown <input type="checkbox"/> Refuelling			<input type="checkbox"/> Stable power operation <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing power <input type="checkbox"/> Decreasing power <input type="checkbox"/> Start-up (to coupling)		<input type="checkbox"/> Hot standby <input type="checkbox"/> Hot shutdown <input type="checkbox"/> Cold shutdown <input type="checkbox"/> Refuelling					
RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS												
PERSONNEL DOSE					ENVIRONMENTAL EMISSIONS							
<input type="checkbox"/> No effects <input type="checkbox"/> Within authorised limits <input type="checkbox"/> Outside authorised limits					<input type="checkbox"/> No effects <input type="checkbox"/> Within authorised limits <input type="checkbox"/> Outside authorised limits							
CHARACTERISTICS OF EVENT												
DURATION OF EVENT OR CONDITION:												
SAFETY SYSTEMS ACTUATED:												
NUMBER OF ANOMALIES:												

NPP LOGO		REPORT ON EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE CSN IN 30 DAYS		Sheet (X) of (N) (*)
NSINo	Rev.	Report date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Event date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Time of occurrence of event (hh:mm)
PLANT / GROUP:				
TITLE:				
<p>1.- DESCRIPTION OF EVENT AND ANOMALIES</p> <p>1.1.- Summary of event</p> <p>1.2.- Background and in-house and industry operating experience linked to event</p> <p>1.3.- Initial conditions</p> <p>1.4.- Chronological description of event</p> <p>1.5.- Detailed description of event and anomalies occurring</p> <p>2.- CAUSES OF EVENT</p> <p>2.1.- Direct causes of event</p> <p>2.2.- Description and conclusions of root cause analysis (or date foreseen for completion of analysis where appropriate)</p> <p>3.- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS</p> <p>3.1.- Immediate corrective actions</p> <p>3.2.- Deferred corrective actions</p> <p>4.- CONCLUSIONS</p>				

NPP LOGO		REPORT ON EVENT REPORTABLE TO THE CSN IN 30 DAYS			Sheet (X) of N (*)
NSI No	Rev.	Report date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Event date (dd/mm/yyyy)	Time of occurrence of event (hh:mm)	
PLANT / GROUP:					
TITLE:					
5.- CODED DESCRIPTION OF ANOMALIES					
Title of anomaly					
Date and time of anomaly					
DATE		Time		Rev.	
Day		Mnth	Year	Hrs.	Min.
IDENTIFICATION					
SYSTEM	TYPE OF COMPONENT	OF COMPONENT			
EFFECT ON SYSTEM			ROOT CAUSE		
<input type="radio"/> Degraded operation <input type="radio"/> Loss of train <input type="radio"/> Loss of function <input type="radio"/> Spurious actuation <input type="radio"/>			<input type="radio"/> Human actions (plant personnel) <input type="radio"/> Error in design / manuf. assembly / procedures <input type="radio"/> Mechanical / hydraulic / pneumatic fault <input type="radio"/> Electrical / instrumentation / control fault <input type="radio"/> Other causes		
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS					
<input type="radio"/> Adjustment, calibration, cleaning <input type="radio"/> Replacement of parts <input type="radio"/> Replacement of components <input type="radio"/> Modification / redesign			<input type="radio"/> Special surveillance <input type="radio"/> No action <input type="radio"/> Other action		
LITERAL DESCRIPTION:					

(*) As many pages as are necessary.