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The logo for the Consejo Superior de Normas (CSN) is displayed. It features a large, bold, green letter 'C' followed by the letters 'S' and 'N' in a dark blue color. The letters are sans-serif and have a modern, clean appearance. The logo is positioned on the left side of the page, below a horizontal line that spans the width of the page.

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Nuclear Safety Council instruction IS-10, revision 2, dated September 7, 2023, establishes the criteria to be applied by nuclear power plants in order to report events to the Council.

Article 2.a) of Law 15/1980, dated April 22, on creation of the *Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear* (Nuclear Safety Council or CSN), grants this public authority the power “to develop and approve Instructions, Circular Orders and Guides of a technical nature relating to radioactive and nuclear facilities, as well as to activities in the areas of nuclear safety and radiation protection”.

Following the publication of Nuclear Safety Council Instruction IS-10, revision 1, on July 30, 2014, *which establishes the criteria that nuclear power plants should apply to report events to the Council*, and taking into account the experience accumulated since its publication, it was rendered necessary to draw up a new revision of Instruction IS-10 in order to facilitate and clarify the reporting of events occurred at nuclear power plants, modifying both the general reporting conditions and the types of events to be reported.

The five main objectives pursued through the notification process and its associated reports, are as follows:

- To keep the Nuclear Safety Council duly informed of incidents of certain importance occurring in Spanish nuclear power plants.
- To provide the Nuclear Safety Council with the opportunity to adopt suitable measures within a period of time commensurate with the actual situation of the facility, if necessary.
- To identify incidents in which a nuclear power plant must carry out the necessary operating experience analysis with the aim to avoid repetition of the event or other similar ones.
- To initiate the process of exchanging operating experience between power plants, such that within their in-house processes, other licensees may adopt preventive or corrective measures aimed at avoiding the occurrence of similar events.
- To allow the Nuclear Safety Council to transparently inform the public and stakeholders of events occurring at Spanish nuclear power plants.

By virtue of the above, and in conformity with the legal powers foreseen in article 2.a) of Law 15/1980, dated April 22, by which the Nuclear Safety Council was created following consultation with the affected sectors and issuance of the appropriate technical reports.

During its meeting of September 7, 2023, this Council agreed as follows:

One. Purpose and Field of Application.

This Instruction aims to establish the criteria by which the Nuclear Safety Council requests the licensees of operating licenses for nuclear power plants, to report any events occurring at their facilities that might be related to nuclear safety or radiological protection.

Security-related events are excluded from the scope of this Instruction to all effects, as they are subject to their own specific standards.

Two. Definitions.

The definitions of terms and concepts used in this Nuclear Safety Council Instruction correspond to those contained in the following provisions:

- Law 25/1964, dated April 25, on Nuclear Energy.
- Law 15/1980, dated April 22, on creation of the Nuclear Safety Council.
- Royal Decree 1836/1999, dated December 3, approving the Regulation on Nuclear and Radioactive Facilities.
- Approval of the Consolidated Text of the General Social Security Act, Legislative Royal Decree 8/2015, dated October 30.
- Royal Decree 1400/2018, dated November 23, approving the Regulation on nuclear safety at radioactive facilities.
- Royal Decree 1029/2022, dated December 20, approving the Regulation on health protection against hazards associated to ionizing radiation exposure.

The following definitions are also applicable in the context of this Instruction:

Reactor Protection System Activation:

Automatic or manual generation of a complete signal for automatic reactor shutdown.

Unscheduled actuation:

System or component actuation in response to its own failure or to a real incident, or unplanned system or component actuation during implementation of a plant test or procedure.

Safety barriers:

These refer to:

- a) The ceramic matrix and the nuclear fuel cladding.
- b) The reactor coolant system pressure boundary.
- c) The containment.

Valid actuation demand:

This refers to an actuation demand triggered by a valid signal or a deliberate manual action.

A valid signal is one initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the initiation requirements of a system safety function.

Documents and records to be kept:

Documents and records relating to nuclear safety or radiological protection, generated during the site study, design, construction, operation and dismantling phases of a nuclear facility, that are to be kept under suitable conditions for a specified period of time.

Site:

Fenced off area which houses an authorized, defined facility under the responsibility of the licensee. The interior of such facility is subject to a series of controls, limits and regulations.

Fire:

Process of violent combustible material oxidization with the giving off of flames, heat or gases.

Fire event:

Sustained fire with the capacity to cause damage to people, facilities or the environment.

Internal flooding:

Unforeseen liquid discharge or ingress in a plant cubicle, such that any of the following conditions are met:

1. The liquid extends outside the cubicle in which it originated.
2. The liquid reaches or is sprayed onto metallic elements or cabinets of electrical and instrumentation systems.
3. The liquid level exceeds 50% of bedplate height in mechanical components.
4. The liquid level exceeds 50% of the height at which instruments are located, except those for water level detection.

Release of radioactive materials or substances:

The emission of radioactive materials or substances outside their corresponding confinement limits, along channels foreseen or unforeseen for this purpose.

Uncontrolled release:

The release of radioactive materials or substances in an unplanned manner or occurring outside the terms in which such release was contemplated and documented.

Unscheduled shutdown:

It is the disconnection from the main electrical generator, taking place within 72 hours of discovering the cause or condition giving rise to it.

Spillage of radioactive materials or substances:

The release of radioactive materials or substances via the channels contemplated for such purpose in plant procedures.

Three. *Licensee Responsibilities.*

Nuclear power plant licensees shall be responsible for meeting the requirements established in this Safety Instruction, in the manner and terms set out therein.

Four. *Reporting Conditions.*

Licensees shall adhere to the following conditions for reporting events to the Nuclear Safety Council:

4.1 The events to be reported are those set out in article five of this Instruction, regardless of whether or not they were previously reported to the Nuclear Safety Council when the emergency situation was declared, as defined in the Onsite Emergency Plan (hereinafter, OEP). In addition to the above, all events which might be safety significant according to the operator, shall be reported.

4.2 Events should be reported to the Nuclear Safety Council using a trustworthy method; preferably and in this order by means of electronic register, fax or register. Furthermore, the licensee shall inform the plant Resident Inspector (RI) as soon as possible.

4.3 Events shall always be reported when the fact to be notified has taken place during the three years prior to its discovery.

4.4 Events shall be reported to the Nuclear Safety Council using the forms included in annexes I and II, as soon as possible and within the maximum period indicated in parentheses in each case (4 hours or 24 hours), including all the preliminary information available as of that time, except as established in Notification Condition 4.9. In the case of events to be reported within 4 hours, a second notification shall be sent within 24 hours in all cases, including the extended event information available up to that time.

4.5 In the case of licensee events which also entailed the declaration of an emergency situation declared in accordance with the site's OEP, issuance of the 4-hour notification shall not be necessary. Instead, the first report should be submitted within 24 hours after OEP deactivation using the corresponding form.

4.6 In all cases, including emergency situations and within a maximum time window of 30 days, an event report shall be submitted to the Nuclear Safety Council using the form included in annex III, including the information obtained during the time elapsing since event occurrence, with a special focus on concurrent failures and corrective actions, as well as indicating an estimated implementation date. This report, or a revision of it, shall include the conclusions drawn from the Root Cause

Analysis (hereinafter, RCA) performed. If one month after event occurrence the RCA was still to be completed, the 30-day report shall include the foreseen date of RCA completion, which shall not exceed three months from the first notification date, except when it depends on factors beyond the licensee's control, in which case the period may be extended up to a maximum of one year. The justification for this circumstance must be communicated to the Nuclear Safety Council before the end of the initial three months.

4.7 The RCA shall be performed for all licensee events, with the possible exception of those for which causes are exclusively attributable to factors outside the control of the licensee and which had no anomalous consequences (human errors or failures) for nuclear power plant operation. The RCA shall be developed using internationally recognized methodologies and with a scope commensurate with its safety significance.

4.8 Unless otherwise indicated in article five, the notification time periods included within each notification criterion shall be counted from the very moment the event to be reported is discovered. The obligation to report shall be continuous and shall persist over time even when the terms established for each type of event have not been fulfilled.

4.9 In the case of licensee events reportable in accordance with Notification Condition 4.3 where at the time of event discovery there is no reportable condition present, the initial notification may be performed in all cases within a maximum period of 24 hours.

4.10 In addition to notifications to be made within the different time periods mentioned above, any additional degradation of plant safety level or worsening of plant conditions shall be reported immediately, along with the evaluation results of such conditions, the effectiveness of adopted plant responses or corrective actions, as well as the inaccuracies or errors modifying the contents of previous reports. Furthermore, it shall also be necessary to report any plant response not understood by the licensee.

As a result, reports submitted to the Nuclear Safety Council shall be subjected to a new revision to inform of the following circumstances:

Four-hour report:

Important degradations occurring during the first 24 hours of event evolution and substantially altering the contents of the report submitted.

24-hour report:

Additional degradations occurring during the event and not previously reported.

Unfavorable, unforeseen or misunderstood evolution of plant conditions in the course of the event.

Discovery of conditions additional to those initially reported which, after detection during the licensee's subsequent investigation, widen the scope of the event reported.

30-day report: RCA conclusions.

Final conclusions of the process of revision, analysis and investigation opened following the issuance of a licensee event report.

Aspects to be reported which were incomplete or not suitably covered.

Modification or removal of corrective actions committed to in earlier reports, including a justification.

The Nuclear Safety Council may at any time reasonably request additional event information or the revision of the corresponding reports.

4.11 If one single reportable fact includes more than one of the criteria contemplated in article five, one single notification shall suffice, indicating such circumstance in the associated reports by ticking all the applicable criteria boxes. The notification term shall be the shortest term of the applicable events.

4.12 If as a direct result of a notification submitted to the Nuclear Safety Council, the licensee identified during the subsequent event investigation process, new circumstances associated to the event which would themselves require a notification, the new information may be included in a revision of the first event reported, using the 24-hour report format. Conclusions extracted from the completed review and analysis process, shall be included in the final revision of the 30-day report containing the RCA conclusions. Any findings subsequent to this revision shall be issued as a new licensee event.

4.13 In case of discrepancies between the Nuclear Safety Council and the licensee regarding the applicability of conditions or event notification criteria, the criterion of the Nuclear Safety Council shall prevail and the notification shall be carried out in accordance with the criteria reasoned and specified by the technical experts of the Nuclear Safety Council. The licensee may leave evidence of such discrepancy in the report itself.

4.14 After issuance of the 24-hour report, the licensee may inform the Nuclear Safety Council of the withdrawal of a licensee event when, as a result of gathering additional information, it is demonstrated that the circumstances giving rise to the need to report did not actually exist. The notification to withdraw a licensee event shall include an explanation of the reasons why withdrawal is requested and shall be considered as having been accepted if the Nuclear Safety Council has not informed to the contrary within three months after notification withdrawal reception. The numbering of the withdrawn licensee event may not be reused.

Five. Notification Criteria.

A. Records.

A.1 Destruction, loss, mislaying or undue alteration of documents and records to be kept, unless it affects classified documents beyond the scope of this Safety Instruction (24 hours).

B. Occupational health and safety.

B.1 Any event in which a person onsite and outside the surveilled or controlled area, has received or may have received according to a preliminary estimate, a dose exceeding any of the dose limits established by Spanish regulations for members of the public (24 hours after obtaining preliminary estimation results).

B.2 Any event in which a radiation worker, trainee or student has received or may have received according to a preliminary estimate, a dose exceeding any of the occupation exposure dose limits established by Spanish regulations, provided it is not an exposure expressly authorized by the CSN. Doses received from a single exposure or from cumulative exposures, from both external irradiation and internal contamination, shall be considered (24 hours after obtaining preliminary estimation results).

B.3 No content.

B.4 Any event in which a radiation worker has received or may have received during their time at the plant, either due to a single exposure or to cumulative exposures, an unplanned dose which exceeds the external, internal or skin dosimetry intervention threshold for radiation workers due to external personal contamination, as established in the Radiation Protection Manual (24 hours after obtaining preliminary estimation results).

B.5 Any occupational accident occurring at the plant site in which a person died or had to be evacuated from the facility due to serious or very serious causes and in order to receive medical treatment. The accident shall be classified on the basis of the occupational medical diagnosis performed on the affected individual (4 hours in the event of death, 24 hours in the event of a serious accident once the medical diagnosis is obtained).

C. Spillages and releases of radioactive materials or substances.

C.1 Any occurrence resulting in an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or substances offsite where the emitted activity of any identified isotope exceeds the value indicated in Table A of Regulatory Instruction IS-05 (24 hours).

C.2 Any uncontrolled release, within the double fence and outside of the surveilled or controlled area, of radioactive materials or substances which requires or would have required zoning reclassification in accordance with any of the dose or contamination criteria for at least 8 hours (24 hours).

C.3 Any uncontrolled release of radioactive materials or substances, within the surveilled or controlled area, which meets any of the following conditions:

1. It involves a contact dose rate increase greater than or equal to 1 mSv/h, and results in reclassification of the affected area, or it involves an area dose rate increase of 20 mSv/h (24 hours).

2. It requires or would have required contamination-induced reclassification to a regulated stay area or forbidden access area for more than 8 hours (24 hours).

3. It involves or would have involved subjecting workers to previously unforeseen special protective or surveillance measures, with the total number of affected individuals being equal to or higher than 10 (24 hours).

C.4 Any spillage causing the cumulative dose over the past 12 months, calculated using the methodology contained in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, to exceed 1 mSv (24 hours).

C.5 Any actuation triggered by a valid signal from liquid or gaseous effluent monitors located in release pathways offsite, which led to exceeding the setpoint deriving from the instantaneous limit included within the Tech Specs (24 hours).

C.6 Exit from the site of radioactive materials failing to comply with, or having failed to comply with, any of the contamination or radiation intensity limits established in the Spanish regulation on the transport of hazardous goods, or detection of non-declassified radioactive materials which were managed as non-radioactive, excluding materials containing natural radionuclides in their natural state (24 hours).

C.7 Discovery of design, manufacturing, assembly, maintenance or procedural deficiencies which resulted or could have resulted in uncontrolled releases of radioactive material offsite or inside the double fence, outside the surveilled or controlled area (24 hours).

D. Technical Specifications (hereinafter Tech Specs).

D.1 Initiation of the shutdown sequence (4 hours) or change of operating mode (24 hours), when required by a Tech Specs action.

D.2 Any entry into a Tech Specs condition which requires initiating a shutdown sequence or an operating mode change, when they are not initiated (24 hours).

D.3 Any operation or condition not allowed by the plant Tech Specs, such as Tech Specs non-compliances with the design features chapter and non-compliances with surveillance requirements, including surveillance requirements incorrectly captured in procedures, except when any of the following circumstances apply (4 hours):

- a. the specification is of an administrative nature, or
- b. the event is simply a foreseen surveillance test implementation delay, and all the following conditions are met:
 - the test implementation delay did not exceed 25% of the surveillance period allowed by Tech Specs plus the time of the associated action,
 - measures were taken to prevent delay repetition,
 - the test was performed within 24 hours and the specified frequency from the time of discovery, demonstrating that the piece of equipment was capable of fulfilling its specified safety functions, or is going to be performed within 24 hours and the specified frequency from the time of discovery, with a reasonable guarantee of a positive test implementation result being obtained.
- c. the specifications were revised prior to the event being discovered, such that

the operation or condition is no longer prohibited at the time of discovery.

d. non-compliance with Tech Specs surveillance requirements due to being incorrectly captured in test procedures, provided that the operable condition of the affected piece of equipment was verified within the minimum time between 24 hours and the specified frequency, counted from the moment such situation was discovered, and did not result in any inadvertent prohibited condition due to this cause within the last three years.

In the case of emergencies declared in accordance with the OEP, the licensee must notify based on this criterion any Tech Specs non-compliance that it decides voluntarily during the course of the emergency, in accordance with Notification Condition 4.5 (4 hours).

D.4 Complementary to D3, the following operational situations shall be notifiable:

a. Tech Specs surveillance requirements incorrectly captured in test procedures, provided they did not result in any inadvertent prohibited condition due to this cause within the last three years.

b. exceeding the Tech Specs action timeline in immediate operability determinations, when the result is operable or operable with an abnormal condition.

(24 hours).

D.5 Exceeding, even if it is a one-off event, the value of a Tech Specs limiting condition for operation parameter which might affect the integrity of safety barriers, the reactivity control or the in-core power distribution function. Events of this type expected during implementation of scheduled tests, shall not be reported (24 hours).

D.6 Discovery of errors or omissions in the wording of Tech Specs, including surveillance requirements, that do not ensure compliance with associated Licensing Bases. Specifications of an administrative nature are excluded (24 hours).

E. Operations.

E.1 Unscheduled plant shutdown. In order for a plant shutdown to be considered as scheduled, the corresponding fax indicating the foreseen shutdown moment must be received at the CSN's Emergency Response Room (hereinafter, SALEM) with at least 72-hour notice. The fax shall also indicate the cause or limit value of the affected parameter that would cause the shutdown if exceeded (4 hours).

E.2 No content.

E.3 Any incident during refueling outage or fuel handling evolutions in which damage was inflicted, or could have been inflicted, or could be inflicted after start-up, to fuel assemblies or parts thereof, or to internal vessel structures, as well as incidents in which there was a risk of falling objects potentially causing the same type of damage (4 hours).

E.4 Fires and fire events activating the corresponding detection systems, as long as they occur in fire areas which house structures, systems or components relating

to safety or necessary for safe shutdown in the event of a fire event. In case the detection systems are inoperable, it is required to report any fire or fire event which would have activated such systems if these had been available, or that would have required the activation of an extinguishing device (4 hours).

E.5 Internal flooding in which safety-related structures, systems or components were affected or could have been affected (4 hours).

E.6 Any internal phenomenon or condition threatening plant safety or preventing or significantly hindering personnel from carrying out the tasks needed for safe operation, including organizational shift personnel norms included within the Tech Specs (4 hours).

E.7 Any other event not contemplated in the remaining criteria which might, according to the plant operator, be of importance for safety. Depending on its importance, the event shall be reported as soon as possible.

F. Safety systems.

F.1 Unscheduled activation, whether automatic or manual, of the reactor protection system (4 hours with the reactor critical and 24 hours with the reactor sub-critical).

F.2 Any event or condition causing a manual or automatic actuation demand of any system listed under this criterion (24 hours), except when:

- a. The actuation demand occurs as part of a planned sequence during testing or during reactor operation, or
- b. The actuation demand is not valid and;

- i. It occurred with the system correctly out of service; or
 - ii. It occurred after the safety function had been completed. The systems to which this criterion is applicable are as follows:

- 1. Containment isolation signals affecting the containment isolation valves of more than one system or several Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV).

- 2. PWR-type reactor Emergency Core Cooling Systems (hereinafter, ECCS), including the high, medium and low pressure injection systems and the low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.

- 3. BWR-type reactor ECCS, including the high and low pressure core spray systems, the high and low pressure coolant injection systems and the low pressure coolant injection function of the residual heat removal system.

- 4. In BWR reactors, the isolated core cooling system.

- 5. In PWR reactors, the auxiliary or emergency feedwater system.

- 6. The containment heat removal and depressurization systems, including containment spray systems and cooling systems equipped with emergency fans.

- 7. Emergency alternating current electrical systems, including the emergency or safeguard Diesel Generators (hereinafter, DGs), other electrical installations used instead of the DGs and the dedicated division III DGs at BWR plants.

- 8. Emergency service water systems not normally in service and having as one of their functions that of the ultimate heat sink.

9. Plant systems acting as protection against cold overpressure (Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) and safety valves of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system).

10. The control room emergency ventilation and isolation system.

F.3 Safety or relief valve or group of valves, in safety-related systems or in systems having a specific safety function, which did not open or close within the admissible pressure range during a transient, thus failing to comply with the system or design bases. Relief and safety valves on steam generators are included within this criterion. System testing is excluded (24 hours).

F.4 Absence of forced spent fuel pool cooling for a period of more than one hour, except when such absence was part of a scheduled sequence (24 hours).

F.5 Unforeseen fuel pool or reactor cavity overflow or level drop below the minimum required (4 hours).

F.6 No content.

F.7 Any combination of inoperabilities, arising from any cause or combination of causes, which has prevented or which, with reasonable expectation at the time of notification, could have prevented compliance with the specified safety function of a structure or system needed to ensure the following (24 hours):

Shutdown of the reactor, keeping it in a safe shutdown condition.

Removal of residual heat.

Control of radioactive material releases.

Mitigation of consequences resulting from a design basis accident.

F.8 Any situation or circumstance in which a condition or single cause resulted, or which with reasonable expectation at the time of notification, could have resulted in inoperability of two or more trains or channels of the same system or of different systems designed to ensure the following (24 hours):

Shutdown of the reactor, keeping it in safe shutdown condition.

Remove residual heat.

Control radioactive material releases.

Mitigation of consequences resulting from a design basis accident.

This criterion does not take into account cases in which inoperabilities are caused by subsequent or cascading failures due to dependencies between main systems and supporting systems that are a natural or expected consequence of the approved design.

F.9 No content.

G. Other situations of risk.

G.1 Any event or condition which results in an unanalyzed situation that could degrade site safety (24 hours).

G.2 Any event which could give rise to the following (4 hours):

G.2.1 A reduction, lasting more than 6 hours, of the capacity the licensee would have to assess the actual plant situation if an emergency were to occur, including a loss of the following:

- a. Plant monitors, alarms and indications necessary to assess emergency situations, or
- b. Designated emergency response facilities, such as the Technical Support Center (hereinafter, TSC) or the Alternative Emergency Management Center (hereinafter, AEMC).

G.2.2 Loss of the plant's capacity (Main Control Room, TSC and AEMC) to communicate with the *SALEM* or the Operational Coordination Center (hereinafter, OCC), this being understood as the loss of at least one of the following resources for a period longer than six hours, or twenty-four hours in the case of scheduled unavailability reported to the Nuclear Safety Council:

- a. The entire "dedicated" data transmission system redundancy.
- b. The entire "dedicated" voice communication system redundancy.

Communication losses caused by *SALEM* operation, shall not be reported.

G.3 Occurrence of an event or condition requiring the implementation of safety-related activities not contemplated in plant procedures (4 hours).

H. External events.

H.1 Any natural phenomenon or condition external to the plant that implies a potential impact on safety, or that reduces the capacity of production personnel to operate the plant safely (4 hours). This includes the following:

- a. Damage to dams that might threaten plant integrity.
- b. Wind or rainfall in excess of a value established by the licensee, which shall not be lower than 90% of the value triggering OEP activation.
- c. Uncontrolled fire at a distance of less than 5 km from the site.
- d. Release of toxic, explosive or hazardous substances at a distance of less than 5 km from the site, especially when the advancement of released substances might affect plant operation.
- e. Unforeseen explosions close to the site (8-km radius around the plant).
- f. Flooding that might reach the lower level of any site building or any of the switchyards.
- g. Earthquakes exceeding the plant instrumentation alarm threshold value.
- h. Crashing of a powered aircraft at a distance of less than 2 km from the site.
- i. Abnormal air traffic over the site.
- j. Strikes affecting the operating conditions or safety of the plant.

Offsite events potentially leading to OEP activation shall be reported according to a threshold which should be below the actual OEP limits.

Six. Exemptions.

Licensees may request, within the framework of this Instruction, a temporary, full or partial exemption from any of the requirements included in applicable standards, suitably justifying the reasons for their request and pointing out the alternative approach in which requirements will be met with the aim to maintain adequate levels of quality and safety.

Seven. Infringements and Penalties.

This Nuclear Safety Council Safety Instruction is binding, pursuant to the provisions of article 2.a) of Law 15/1980, dated April 22, creating the Nuclear Safety Council. Thus, any non-compliance therewith shall be penalized as set out in chapter XIV (articles 85 to 93) of the Nuclear Energy Act, Law 25/1964, dated April.

Single transitional provision.

Any section within this Instruction which contains the expression “no content”, is maintained with the aim to favor the identification of events reported in accordance with the criteria those sections contained in previous revisions of this Instruction. As of the entry into force of this Instruction, the events included in such criteria shall not be reported.

Sole derogating provision.

Nuclear Safety Council Safety Instruction IS-10, revision 1, dated July 30, 2014, which establishes criteria for nuclear power plants to report events to the Council, is hereby expressly made null and void, along with whatever provisions of equal or lower rank which might contradict the provisions of this Instruction.

Sole final provision.

This Instruction shall enter into force four months after its publication in the “Official Gazette” of Spain.

Madrid, September 7, 2023 - The Chairman of the Nuclear Safety Council, Juan Carlos Lentijo Lentijo

ANNEX I

NPP LOGO		4-HOUR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TO THE CSN			Sheet 1 of N □□□	
LER No.	Rev.	DATE OF EVENT			Time of event occurrence (hh:mm)	
		DAY	MONTH	YEAR		
Plant / Unit		Name of individual reporting / Position		Date/ Time of Notification		Phone
Power Level prior to Event (Thermal and Electrical MW)		Power Level at the time of Notification (Thermal and Electrical MW)		RI Informed		
				YES ☐	NO ☐	
TYPE OF EVENT						
B5	Any occupational accident occurring within the site and involving the death of a person.					
D1	Initiation of the shutdown sequence when required by Technical Specifications.					
D3	Any operation or condition not allowed by the plant Technical Specifications.					
E1	Unscheduled plant shutdown.					
E3	Any event or condition affecting the plant and implying or having implied a potential impact on safety, including the degradation of a safety barrier.					
E4	Fires and fire events activating the corresponding detection systems, as long as they occur in fire cubicles, areas or zones containing safety-related structures, systems or components.					
E5	Internal flooding, provided it occurs in areas where safety-related structures, systems or components might have been affected.					
E6	Any internal phenomenon or condition threatening plant safety or significantly preventing or hindering personnel from carrying out the tasks needed to ensure safe operation.					
E7	Any other event not contemplated in the previous points that might, according to the plant operator, be of importance for safety.					
F1	Unscheduled actuation, whether automatic or manual, of the reactor protection system, with the reactor critical.					
F5	Unforeseen fuel pool or reactor cavity overflow or level drop below the minimum required.					
G2	Significant reduction of the capacity to assess the actual plant status, or significant loss of the plant's capacity to communicate with the SALEM or OCC.					
G3	Occurrence of an event or condition requiring the implementation of safety-related activities not contemplated in plant procedures.					
H1	Any natural phenomenon or condition external to the plant that implies a potential impact on safety, or that reduces the capacity of production personnel to operate the plant safely.					

NPP LOGO	4-HOUR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TO THE CSN		Sheet X of N □□□
EVENT DESCRIPTION			
SITUATION AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION			
ADOPTED AND FORESEEN MEASURES			
RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (Quantity)			
ARE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASES EXPECTED?			YES ☐ NO ☐

ANNEX II

NPP LOGO		24-HOUR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TO THE CSN						Sheet 1 of N □□□	
LER No.	Rev.	Date of report (dd/mm/yyyy)			Date of event (dd/mm/yyyy)			Time of event occurrence (hh:mm)	
Plant / Unit		Name of individual reporting / Position			Date/ Time of Notification			Phone	
Power Level prior to Event (Thermal and Electrical MW)			Power Level at the time of Notification (Thermal and Electrical MW)				RI Informed		
							YES ☐	NO ☐	
TYPE OF EVENT									
A. Records			A1 ☐						
B. Occupational Health and Safety			B1 ☐ B2 ☐ B4 ☐ B5 ☐						
C. Spillages			C1 ☐ C2 ☐ C3 ☐ C4 ☐ C5 ☐ C6 ☐ C7 ☐						
D. Technical Specifications			D1 ☐ D2 ☐ D3 ☐ D4 ☐ D5 ☐ D6 ☐						
E. Operations			E1 ☐ E3 ☐ E4 ☐ E5 ☐ E6 ☐ E7 ☐						
F. Safety Systems			F1 ☐ F2 ☐ F3 ☐ F4 ☐ F5 ☐ F7 ☐ F8 ☐						
G. Other Situations of Risk			G1 ☐ G2 ☐ G3 ☐						
H. External Events			H1 ☐						
EVENT DESCRIPTION									
SITUATION AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION, IMMEDIATE EVALUATION AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES									
ADOPTED AND SCHEDULED MEASURES									
RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (Quantity)									
ARE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASES EXPECTED?							YES ☐	NO ☐	

NPP LOGO	24-HOUR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TO THE CSN	Sheet X of N □□□	
EVENT DESCRIPTION			
SITUATION AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION, IMMEDIATE EVALUATION AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES			
ADOPTED AND SCHEDULED MEASURES			
RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (Quantity)			
ARE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASES EXPECTED?		YES ☐	NO ☐

ANNEX III

NPP LOGO		30-DAY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT TO THE CSN				Sheet 1 of N □□□	
LER No.	Rev.	Date of report (dd/mm/yyyy)	Date of event (dd/mm/yyyy)		Time of event occurrence (hh:mm)		
PLANT / UNIT:							
TITLE:							
TYPE OF EVENT							
A. Records		A1□					
B. Occupational Health and Safety		B1□ B2□ B4□ B5□					
C. Spillages		C1□ C2□ C3□ C4□ C5□ C6□ C7□					
D. Technical Specifications		D1□ D2□ D3□ D4□ D5□ D6□					
E. Operations		E1□ E3□ E4□ E5□ E6□ E7□					
F. Safety Systems		F1□ F2□ F3□ F4□ F5□ F7□ F8□					
G. Other Situations of Risk		G1□ G2□ G3□					
H. External Events		H1□					
PLANT STATUS							
INITIAL				FINAL			
Initial plant power (% of thermal and electrical power)				Final plant power (% of thermal and electrical power)			
☐ Stable at-power operation ☐ Increasing power ☐ Reducing power ☐ Startup (until coupling)		☐ Hot standby ☐ Hot shutdown ☐ Cold shutdown ☐ Refueling Outage		☐ Stable at-power operation ☐ Increasing power ☐ Reducing power ☐ Startup (until coupling)		☐ Hot standby ☐ Hot shutdown ☐ Cold shutdown ☐ Refueling Outage	
RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS							
PERSONNEL DOSE				RELEASES INTO THE ENVIRONMENT			
☐ No effects ☐ Within authorized limits ☐ Outside authorized limits				☐ No effects ☐ Within authorized limits ☐ Outside authorized limits			
CHARACTERISTICS OF EVENT							
CONDITION OR EVENT DURATION:							
ACTUATED SAFETY SYSTEMS:							
NUMBER OF ANOMALIES:							

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LER No.	Rev.	Date of report	Date of event	Time of event occurrence (hh:mm)
		(dd/mm/yyyy)	(dd/mm/yyyy)	
PLANT / UNIT:				
TITLE:				
1.- ANOMALY AND EVENT DESCRIPTION 1.1.- Summary of the event 1.2.- Background and operating experience (in-house and external) relating to the event 1.3.- Initial Conditions 1.4.- Chronological event description 1.5.- Detailed description of the event and anomalies 2.- EVENT CAUSES 2.1.- Direct event causes 2.2.- Root cause analysis description and conclusions (or, if applicable, expected date of analysis completion) 3.- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 3.1.- Immediate Corrective Actions 3.2.- Differed Corrective Actions 4.- CONCLUSIONS				

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5- CODED ANOMALY DESCRIPTION Title of the anomaly <table border="1" style="width: 100%; height: 20px; margin-top: 5px;"></table> Date and time of the anomaly <table border="1" style="width: 100%; margin-top: 5px;"> <tr> <th style="width: 10%;">DATE</th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 10%;">Time</th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 10%;">Rev.</th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> <th style="width: 5%;"> </th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td>Day</td> <td> </td> <td>Month</td> <td> </td> <td>Year</td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td>Hr.</td> <td> </td> <td>Min.</td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> SYSTEM <table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 40px; height: 40px; vertical-align: middle;"></table> COMPONENT TYPE <table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 40px; height: 40px; vertical-align: middle;"></table> COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION <table border="1" style="display: inline-table; width: 100px; height: 40px; vertical-align: middle;"></table>																	DATE										Time					Rev.				Day		Month		Year						Hr.		Min.					
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