

EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ENERGY

Directorate D - Nuclear energy, safety and ITER **D.3 – Radiation protection and nuclear safety** 

### Verification under the terms of Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty

**Main Conclusions** 

# **SPAIN**

## **Garoña Nuclear Power Plant**

# Discharge and environmental monitoring and national environmental radioactivity monitoring network in the vicinity

Dates

19-21 October 2021

Verification team

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### INTRODUCTION

Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty requires that each Member State shall establish facilities necessary to carry out continuous monitoring of the levels of radioactivity in air, water and soil and to ensure compliance with the basic safety standards<sup>1</sup>.

Article 35 also gives the European Commission (EC) the right of access to such facilities in order that it may verify their operation and efficiency.

The radiation protection and nuclear safety unit (ENER D.3) of the EC's Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER) is responsible for undertaking these verifications.

The main purpose of verifications performed under Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty is to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of monitoring facilities for

- Liquid and airborne discharges of radioactivity into the environment by a site;
- Levels of environmental radioactivity at the site perimeter and in the marine, terrestrial and aquatic environment around the site, for all relevant pathways;
- Levels of environmental radioactivity on the territory of the Member State.

For the purpose of such a review, a verification team from DG ENER visited Spain on 19-21 October 2021. This mission dealt with

- Facilities for routine monitoring of environmental radioactivity and radioactive discharges at the Garoña nuclear power plant;
- Facilities for emergency monitoring of environmental radioactivity at the Garoña nuclear power plant;
- Measuring laboratories, in particular infrastructure, analytical methods, quality assurance and control aspects, as well as reporting.

The present document gives an overview of the main conclusions by the verification team concerning relevant aspects of the environmental surveillance and corresponding suggestions. More detailed information concerning the verification is available in the technical report (TR) of the verification.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom (OJ L 13 of 17.1.2014)

#### MAIN CONCLUSIONS

All verifications that had been planned by the verification team were completed successfully. The information supplied by the Spanish authorities in advance of the visit, as well as the additional documentation received during and after the verification, was useful.

- (1) The verification activities that were performed demonstrated that the facilities necessary to carry out monitoring of levels of radioactivity in air, water and soil at the Garoña nuclear power plant and in its vicinity are adequate. The Commission could verify the operation and efficiency of a representative part of these facilities.
- (2) The verification activities that were performed demonstrated that the facilities necessary to carry out monitoring of levels of radioactivity in air, water and soil at the Garoña nuclear power plant in the event of a radiological emergency are adequate. The Commission could verify the availability of a representative part of these facilities.
- (3) The verification activities that were performed demonstrated that the facilities necessary to carry out continuous monitoring of levels of radioactivity in the gaseous and liquid discharges at the Garoña nuclear power plant are adequate. The Commission could verify the operation and efficiency of a representative part of these facilities.
- (4) The detailed verification findings are compiled in the 'Technical Report' that is addressed to the Spanish competent authority through the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union.
- (5) The Commission services request a report on any significant changes in the set-up of the monitoring arrangements, in particular with regard to the new temporary spent nuclear fuel storage facility (ATI). Based on this report the Commission will consider the need for a follow-up verification.
- (6) Finally, the verification team acknowledges the excellent co-operation it received from all persons involved in the activities it performed.

V. Tanner

Team Leader